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MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS
Felix Frankfurter t
The dictum that history cannot be written without documents is
less than a half-truth if it implies that it can be written from them.
Especially is this so in making an assessment of individual contributions to the collective results of the work of an institution like the
Supreme Court, whose labors, by the very nature of its functions, are
done behind closed doors and, on the whole, without leaving to history
the documentation leading up to what is ultimately recorded in the
United States Reports. To be sure, the opinions of the different
Justices tell things about them-about some, more; about some, less.
As is true of all literary compositions, to a critic saturated in them,
qualities of the writer emerge from the writing. However, even in
the case of an opinion by a Justice with the most distinctive style, what
is said and what is left unsaid present to students of the Court a
fascinating challenge of untangling individual influences in a collective
judgment.
To discover the man behind the opinion and to estimate the influence he may have exerted in the Court's labors, in the case of Mr.
Justice Roberts, is an essentially hopeless task. Before I came on the
Court, I had been a close student of its opinions. But not until I
became a colleague, and even then only after some time, did I come
to realize how little the opinions of Roberts, J. revealed the man and
therefore the qualities that he brought to the work of the Court. In
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his case it can fairly be said the style-his judicial style-was not the
man.
The esprit of Roberts' private communications leave little doubt
that when he came to writing his opinions he restrained the lively
and imaginative phases of his temperament. I speak without knowledge, but he had evidently reflected much on the feel and flavor
of a judicial opinion as an appropriate expression of the judicial
judgment. The fires of his strong feelings were banked by powerful
self-discipline, and only on the rarest occasion does a spark flare up
from the printed page. The sober and declaratory character of his
opinions was, I believe, a form consciously chosen to carry out the
judicial function as he saw it. We are told that Judge Augustus N.
Hand, in disposing of a case that excited much popular agitation, set
himself to writing an opinion in which nothing was "quotable." The
reasons behind this attitude doubtless guided Justice Roberts in
fashioning his judicial style. Moreover, his was, on the whole, a
hidden rather than an obvious nature-hidden, that is, from the public
view. His loyalties were deep, as was his devotion to his convictions.
Both were phases of an uncompromising honesty. They constituted
the most guarded qualities of his personality, and he would not vulgarize them by public manifestation.
In not revealing, indeed in suppressing, the richer and deeper
qualities of his mind and character, the Roberts opinions reflect his
own underestimation of his work. Partly, he was a very modest man,
partly his judicial self-depreciation expressed his sense of awe to be
a member of the bench charged with functions in the language of
Chief Justice Hughes, "of the gravest consequence to our people and
to the future of our institutions." Above all, the standards for his
self-appraisal were, characteristically, judges of the greatest distinction
in the Court's history. On leaving the bench, he wrote: "I have no
illusions about my judicial career. But one can only do what one can.
Who am I to revile the good God that he did not make me a Marshall,
a Taney, a Bradley, a Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo."
Roberts was unjust to himself. He contributed more during his
fifteen years on the Court than he himself could appraise. His extensive, diversified experience at the bar and his informed common
sense brought wisdom to the disposition of the considerable body
of litigation, outside the passions of popular controversy, that still
comes before the Court. Again, his qualities of character-humility
engendered by consciousness of limitations, respect for the views of
others whereby one's own instinctive reactions are examined anew,
subordination of solo performances to institutional interests, courtesy
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in personal relations that derives from respect for the conscientious
labor of others and is not merely a show of formal manners-are
indispensable qualities for the work of any court, but preeminently
for that of the Supreme Court. Probably no Justice in the Court's
history attached more significance to these qualities than Mr. Justice
Brandeis. It tells more than pages of argumentation that Brandeis
held Roberts in especial esteem as a member of the Court.
It is one of the most ludicrous illustrations of the power of lazy
repetition of uncritical talk that a judge with the character of Roberts
should have attributed to him a change of judicial views out of deference
to political considerations. One is more saddened than shocked that
a high-minded and thoughtful United States Senator should assume it
to be an established fact that it was by reason of "the famous switch of
Mr. Justice Roberts" that legislation was constitutionally sustained
after President Roosevelt's proposal for reconstructing the Court and
because of it. The charge specifically relates to the fact that while
Roberts was of the majority in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587, decided June 1, 1936, in reaffirming Adkins v. Children's Hospital., 261 U.S. 525, and thereby invalidating the New York
Minimum Wage Law, he was again with the majority in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379, decided on March 29, 1937, overruling the Adkins case and sustaining minimum wage legislation. Intellectual responsibility should, one would suppose, save a thoughtful
man from the familiar trap of post hoc ergo propter hoc. Even those
whose business it is to study the work of the Supreme Court have lent
themselves to a charge which is refuted on the face of the Court
records. It is refuted, that is, if consideration is given not only to
opinions but to appropriate deductions drawn from data pertaining to
the time when petitions for certiorari are granted, when cases are
argued, when dispositions are, in normal course, made at conference,
and when decisions are withheld because of absences and divisions on
the Court.
It is time that this false charge against Roberts be dissipated by
a recording of the indisputable facts. Disclosure of Court happenings
not made public by the Court itself, in its opinions and orders, presents a ticklish problem. The secrecy that envelops the Court's work
is not due to love of secrecy or want of responsible regard for the
claims of a democratic society to know how it is governed. That the
Supreme Court should not be amenable to the forces of publicity to
which the Executive and the Congress are subjected is essential to the
effective functioning of the Court. But the passage of time may
enervate the reasons for this restriction, particularly if disclosure rests
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not on tittle-tattle or self-serving declarations. The more so is justification for thus lifting the veil of secrecy valid if thereby the conduct
of a Justice whose intellectual morality has been impugned is vindicated.
The truth about the so-called "switch" of Roberts in connection
with the Minimum Wage cases is that when the Tipaldo case was
before the Court in the spring of 1936, he was prepared to overrule
the Adkins decision. Since a majority could not be had for overruling
it, he silently agreed with the Court in finding the New York statute
under attack in the Tipaldo case not distinguishable from the statute
which had been declared unconstitutional in the Adkins case. That
such was his position an alert reader could find in the interstices of
the United States Reports. It took not a little persuasion-so indifferent was Roberts to misrepresentation-to induce him to set forth
what can be extracted from the Reports.* Here it is:
"A petition for certiorari was filed in Morehead v. Tipaldo,
298 U.S. 587, on March 16, 1936. When the petition came to
be acted upon, the Chief Justice spoke in favor of a grant, but
several others spoke against it on the ground that the case was
ruled by Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525. Justices
Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone were in favor of a grant. They, with
the Chief Justice, made up four votes for a grant.
"When my turn came to speak I said I saw no reason to
grant the writ unless the Court were prepared to re-examine and
overrule the Adkins case. To this remark there was no response
around the table, and the case was marked granted.
"Both in the petition for certiorari, in the brief on the merits,
and in oral argument, counsel for the State of New York took
the position that it was unnecessary to overrule the Adkins case
in order to sustain the position of the State of New York. It
was urged that further data and experience and additional facts
distinguished the case at bar from the Adkins case. The argument seemed to me to be disingenuous and born of timidity. I
could find nothing in the record to substantiate the alleged distinction. At conference I so stated, and stated further that I
was for taking the State of New York at its word. The State
had not asked that the Adkins case be overruled but that it be
distinguished. I said I was unwilling to put a decision on any
such ground. The vote was five to four for affirmance, and the
case was assigned to Justice Butler.
"I stated to him that I would concur in any opinion which
was based on the fact that the State had not asked us to re-examine
or overrule Adkins and that, as we found no material difference
in the facts of the two cases, we should therefore follow the Adkins case. The case was originally so written by Justice Butler,
* Mr. Justice Roberts gave me this memorandum on November 9, 1945, after
he had resigned from the bench. He left the occasion for using it to my discretion.
For reasons indicated in the text, the present seems to me an appropriate time for
making it public.
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but after a dissent had been circulated he added matter to his
opinion, seeking to sustain the Adkins case in principle. My
proper course would have been to concur specially on the narrow
ground I had taken. I did not do so. But at conference in the Court
I said that I did not propose to review and re-examine the Adkins case until a case should come to the Court requiring that
this should be done.
"August 17, 1936, an appeal was filed in West Coast Hotels
[sic] Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379. The Court as usual
met to consider applications in the week of Monday, October 5,
1936, and concluded its work by Saturday, October 10. During
the conferences the jurisdictional statement in the Parrish case
was considered and the question arose whether the appeal should
be dismissed* on the authority of Adkins and Morehead. Four of
those who had voted in the majority in the Morehead case voted to
dismiss the appeal in the Parrishcase. I stated that I would vote
for the notation of probable jurisdiction. I am not sure that
I gave my reason, but it was that in the appeal in the Parrish
case the authority of Adkins was definitely assailed and the Court
was asked to reconsider and overrule it. Thus, for the first time,
I was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the
Adkins case. Those who were in the majority in the Morehead
case expressed some surprise at my vote, and I heard one of the
brethren ask another, 'What is the matter with Roberts?'
"Justice Stone was taken ill about October 14. The case
was argued December 16 and 17, 1936, in the absence of Justice
Stone, who at that time was lying in a comatose condition at his
home. It came on for consideration at the conference on December 19. I voted for an affirmance. There were three other such
votes, those of the Chief Justice, Justice Brandeis, and Justice
Cardozo. The other four voted for a reversal.
"If a decision had then been announced, the case would have
been affirmed by a divided Court. It was thought that this would
be an unfortunate outcome, as everyone on the Court knew Justice
Stone's views. The case was, therefore, laid over for further consideration when Justice Stone should be able to participate. Justice Stone was convalescent during January and returned to the
sessions of the Court on February 1, 1937. I believe that the
Parrishcase was taken up at the conference on February 6, 1937,
and Justice Stone then voted for affirmance. This made it possible to assign the case for an opinion, which was done. The decision affirming the lower court was announced March 29, 1937.
"These facts make it evident that no action taken by the President in the interim had any causal relation to my action in the
Parrishcase."
More needs to be said for Roberts than he cared to say for himself. As a matter of history it is regrettable that Roberts' unconcern
* Evidently he meant should be reversed summarily, since the Washington Su-

preme Court had sustained the statute.
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for his own record led him to abstain from stating his position. The
occasions are not infrequent when the disfavor of separate opinions, on
the part of the bar and to the extent that it prevails within the Court,
should not be heeded. Such a situation was certainly presented when
special circumstances made Roberts agree with a result but basically
disagree with the opinion which announced it.
The crucial factor in the whole episode was the absence of Mr.
Justice Stone from the bench, on account of illness, from October 14,
1936, to February 1, 1937. 299 U.S. at iii.
In Chamberlainv. Andrews and its allied cases, decided November
23, 1936, the judgments of the New York Court of Appeals sustaining
the New York Unemployment Insurance Law were "affirmed by an
equally divided Court." 299 U.S. 515. The constitutional outlook represented by these cases would reflect the attitude of a Justice towards
the issues involved in the Adkins case. It can hardly be doubted that
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, JJ. were the four
Justices for reversal in Chamberlain v. Andrews, supra. There can be
equally no doubt that Hughes C.J. and Brandeis and Cardozo, JJ. were
for affirmance. Since Stone, J. was absent, it must have been Roberts
who joined Hughes, Brandeis and Cardozo. The appellants petitioned for a rehearing before the full bench, but since the position of
Stone, as disclosed by his views in the Tipaldo case, would not have
changed the result, i.e., affirmance, the judgments were allowed to
stand and the petition for rehearing was denied. Moreover, in preceding Terms, Roberts had abundantly established that he did not have
the narrow, restrictive attitude in the application of the broad, undefined provisions of the Constitution which led to decisions that provoked the acute controversies in 1936 and 1937.
Indeed, years before the 1936 election, in the 1933 Term, he was
the author of the opinion in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, which
evoked substantially the same opposing constitutional philosophy from
Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, JJ. as their dissent expressed in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,supra. The result
in the Nebbia case was significant enough. But for candor and courage,
the opinion in which Roberts justified it was surely one of the most
important contributions in years in what is perhaps the most farreaching field of constitutional adjudication. It was an effective blow
for liberation from empty tags and meretricious assumptions. In
effect, Roberts wrote the epitaph on the misconception, which had
gained respect from repetition, that legislative price-fixing as such was
at least presumptively unconstitutional. In his opinion in Parrish,the
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Chief Justice naturally relied heavily on Roberts' opinion in Nebbia, for
the reasoning of Nebbia had undermined the foundations of Adkins.
Few speculations are more treacherous than diagnosis of motives
or genetic explanations of the position taken by Justices in Supreme
Court decisions. Seldom can attribution have been wider of the mark
than to find in Roberts' views in this or that case a reflection of economic predilection. He was, to be sure, as all men are, a child of
his antecedents. But his antecedents united with his temperament to
make him a forthright, democratic, perhaps even somewhat innocently trusting, generous, humane creature. Long before it became
popular to regard every so-called civil liberties question as constitutionally self-answering, Roberts gave powerful utterance to his sensitiveness for those procedural safeguards which are protective of
human rights in a civilized society, even when invoked by the least
appealing of characters. See his opinions in Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435, 453, and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 123.
Owen J. Roberts contributed his good and honest share to that
coral-reef fabric which is law. He was content to let history ascertain,
if it would, what his share was. But only one who had the good fortune to work for years beside him, day by day, is enabled to say that
no man ever served on the Supreme Court with more scrupulous regard
for its moral demands than Mr. Justice Roberts.

